Article courtesy of Law Dot News | Corporate | Company Law – Director Delinquency

Director Delinquency Declarations: Managing Your Risk

“Knowledge is power.” (Sir Francis Bacon)

Being a company director carries not only rewards but also risks that you need to manage carefully.

In particular, you are held by the Companies Act to a high standard of conduct. Breaching any of your many duties and responsibilities can have significant negative consequences. Among these is being declared a “delinquent director”. That’s no small thing…

It’s a serious long term career risk

Serious categories of misconduct expose directors to being declared delinquent and thus disqualified from holding any directorship or senior management position for a period ranging from 7 years to a lifetime.

A wide range of less serious categories of misconduct can lead to “probation” orders, with possible consequences including disqualification for up to 5 years, supervision by a mentor, remedial education, community service, and payment of compensation.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that the delinquency risk isn’t just a warning to directors. It also gives victims of director misconduct a powerful remedy.

Let’s illustrate in the context of two recent cases.

Seven years in the wilderness (and a R78m damages bill) for a delinquent MD

Two groups of granite producing companies, one responsible for quarrying and the other for production and export, operated inter-dependently for decades. All went well until the Managing Director of the quarrying group of companies placed them into business rescue. Unsurprisingly, this had a devastating effect on both groups, with mining rights in jeopardy, credit lines and bank facilities lost, production levels affected, discussions with SARS over penalties terminated, and millions wasted both in the business rescue process and in remedying the aftermath.

The companies in the surviving group of companies sued the MD of the quarrying group with allegations that those companies should not have been placed into business rescue at all, and for various other acts of mismanagement and misconduct.

The MD’s defences to these claims found no favour with the Court, which declared him delinquent and ordered him to pay R78m in damages. He had, the Court held, unnecessarily placed companies into business rescue without engaging shareholders and despite available shareholder support and the absence of true financial distress. He had acted with gross negligence, caused substantial financial damage, breached his fiduciary duties (i.e. used his powers improperly and not in the best interests of the companies), and neglected his supervisory duties relating to quarry operations.

Another director, another disqualification

Now let’s move to a struggle between two shareholder factions for control of an investment company with energy sector interests. Exasperated, one faction went to the High Court to challenge the validity of a board resolution and share issue which affected their control of the company. There was substantial value at stake here, possibly (reading between the lines of the judgment) many millions of US dollars.

The dispute eventually found its way to the SCA (Supreme Court of Appeal), where, on application by the opposing shareholder faction, a director (and sometime Executive Chairperson) of the investment company was declared delinquent for seven years.

He had, found the Court, acted with gross negligence, wilful misconduct and breach of trust in performing his functions. Here’s one example among many: even after his removal as Chairperson, he purported to call a shareholder meeting “By order of the Chairman.” That alone, said the Court, was “a blithe disrespect for corporate governance and [a breach of] his fiduciary duty as a director.”

If you’re a director, here’s how to manage your risk

Your best defence against hostile stakeholders will always be to remain fully aware of all your many fiduciary duties, and to scrupulously comply with them. Knowledge is power!

Act early to address any financial issues that could lead to accusations of reckless trading or of causing financial harm to the company. Ensure that proper financial and operational controls and procedures are in place. At all times act strictly in the best interests of your company with transparency and good faith, proactively exercise proper oversight of all operations, and – perhaps most importantly – ask us for advice if in any doubt!

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact us for specific and detailed advice.

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Article courtesy of Law Dot News | Debit Recovery

Debit Recovery – Now Creditors Can Apply for Directors to be Declared Delinquent

“He who is quick to borrow is slow to pay” (Old proverb)

Debit Recovery – A recent High Court decision means that, for the first time, creditors of debtor companies are specifically cleared to apply for the company’s directors to be declared “delinquent” in certain circumstances. And that has significant implications for both directors and creditors.

For directors – major long-term career risks

Company directors need to manage a whole range of duties, responsibilities and risks, including being declared “delinquent” in terms of the Companies Act. For more serious categories of misconduct a director risks disqualification from holding any directorship or senior management position for a period ranging from 7 years to a lifetime.

A wide range of less serious categories of misconduct can lead to “probation” orders, with possible disqualification for up to 5 years, supervision by a mentor, remedial education, community service and payment of compensation.

The fact that creditors can now make delinquency applications adds a new level of director risk, the reality being that of all the stakeholders out for blood after a corporate failure, unpaid creditors may well be the fiercest. Your best defence against any personal attack is to always be aware of, and to scrupulously comply with, all your many fiduciary duties.

For creditors – a new door opens

As a creditor on the other hand, your chances of recovering a company debt from a director personally will depend on a range of factors – whether you hold personal suretyships, whether you can prove personal liability for breach of statutory duties and so on (this is a complex topic – specific legal advice is essential).

Now another door has opened to you, and although as we shall see below you will have to convince the court that you are acting in the public interest, it will certainly make directors think twice about defrauding you or exposing you (and creditors and the public generally) to loss through corporate misconduct.

• The case in question stems from the creditors of a company in liquidation failing to recover their debt from it, and consequently taking action against the directors in their personal capacities for over R370m.
• They also asked the High Court to declare the directors delinquent, and one of the directors objected on the basis that creditors have no power to bring such an application. Indeed, the Companies Act gives this right only to a specific list of stakeholders – namely a shareholder, director, company director, secretary or prescribed officer, registered trade union, employee representative, Takeover Regulation Panel, some organs of state and the CIPC (Companies and Intellectual Property Commission).
• The Court however agreed with the creditors that they could apply under another provision of the Companies Act which allows anyone to apply “acting in the public interest, with leave of the court”. On the facts of this particular matter, the creditors were cleared to proceed under that provision.
• In reaching this decision, the Court took account of the (as yet unproven) serious allegations levelled against the directors – extreme breaches of fiduciary duty over a long period of time and involving substantial amounts of money, “a full panoply of misdemeanours” including gross abuse of position and gross negligence, the large number of directorships held by the directors, the (indirect) involvement of public entities – the list goes on.
• Importantly, the Court rejected the director’s argument that “the danger of giving the creditor such standing was that it could use the threat of a delinquency declaration to squeeze the proverbial few extra bob out of the directors.” Every case, said the Court, must be decided on its own facts, and the fact that creditors are suing directors personally does not automatically mean that they are acting cynically and opportunistically.
• But clearly, to succeed you will have to prove that you are acting in the public interest and not just in your own interest as a creditor. It will help to be able to argue, as the creditors in this case did, that “the general public and creditors deserve and require to be protected in their dealings, engagements and transactions with the companies and close corporations of which the defendants are respectively directors and/or members; and … the relief will protect the public from the defendants repeating or replicating their delinquent conduct in other entities.”

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

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Article courtesy of Law Dot News | Business Law – Company / Corporate Compliance

Directors – When Are They Personally Liable?

“… for the benefit of immunity from liability for its debts, those running the corporation may not use its formal identity to incur obligations recklessly, grossly negligently or fraudulently. If they do, they risk being made personally liable.” (Quoted in the judgment below)

Particularly in hard times, it is not at all uncommon to find yourself unable to recover a debt from a company in financial straits whilst at the same time you know that its directors hold assets in their own names. Can you attack them personally?

The answer is founded in the centuries-old concept of companies as separate legal entities or “juristic persons”. They trade in their own names and have their own assets and liabilities, so as a rule directors will not be personally liable for a company’s debts unless either –

 

1. They signed personal suretyship for them, or
2. They fall foul of one of our law’s provisions entitling a court to declare them personally liable.

So, in the absence of personal suretyships, when in practice can you recover a company debt from its director/s? And when are you as director at risk of being sued personally?

Let’s look at the facts and outcome of a recent High Court case for some insights –

 

The fraudulent car auction, the disappearing company and the director’s defence

 

• The buyer of a car on auction subsequently discovered that it was a 2010 model despite being sold to her as a 2012 model.
• She cancelled the sale, returned the car to the auction company that had sold it to her, and, when her demand for a refund of the purchase price was refused, took a default judgment against the company.
• What followed was a saga of unsuccessful attempts to recover her money from the company, its address having changed and the director claiming to have resigned and sold the company, which he said had ceased trading and was awaiting deregistration.
• The buyer eventually sued the director personally, asking the Court to “pierce the corporate veil”. The director’s defence boiled down to saying that he had not used the company “as a front”.

 

Piercing the corporate veil

“Piercing the corporate veil” in this context is, simply put, a court holding directors personally liable for a company’s debts by declaring that the company is to be “deemed not to be a juristic person” in respect of particular debt/s.

On what grounds will a court make such a declaration? Per the High Court in this matter:

 

• Where there is “fraud and the improper use of a company or conduct of the affairs of a company” or
• “[W]here its incorporation, use or an act performed by or on its behalf [the Court’s underlining] constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity.”

 

The director’s misrepresentation and “cavalier disregard” for the company’s interests

 

• On the facts, the Court found that the director had misrepresented the details of the motor vehicle to the buyer, that this misrepresentation was material and induced her to purchase the vehicle, and that it “was deliberate such that it amounted to fraud, alternatively dishonesty, further alternatively improper conduct.”
• “Additionally, as the director and owner, he acted with cavalier disregard for the interests of the company … Such conduct is manifestly not in the best interest of the company and may be considered reckless and dishonest. This conduct was indubitably with callous disregard for its effect on the company as a separate legal entity and at a time when he describes its financial situation as being parlous.Therefore, whilst a director is entitled to resign at any time, his resignation cannot be used as a means of evading his fiduciary duties as a director.”
• Concluding that “the conduct of the director adversely affected the [buyer] in a way that reasonably should not be countenanced and which constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the company’s juristic personality”, the Court declared him personally liable to repay her the purchase price, interest, and costs.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

 

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Article courtesy of Law Dot News | Sexual Harassment

A Victim of Sexual Harassment Must Report It “Immediately”

“…sexual harassment is a heinous and horrendous conduct since it undermines the dignity of women and the values enshrined in our Constitution.” (Extract from judgment below)

Employers have a strong duty to provide a safe workplace for their employees, and to protect them from harm – including sexual harassment. An employer who fails in this faces claims for damages and compensation, but as a recent Labour Court judgment shows, the victim must first follow procedure correctly, and without delay.

Delayed reporting kills a claim

A female employee claimed “a just and equitable compensation” from her employer after she was sexually harassed by two male superiors.

Her claim failed, the Court finding that her delay in reporting the incidents to her employer (two years in one case and three in the other) were……

The correct procedure, and the required timing

The employee’s claim was based on an allegation that her employer had contravened section 60 of the Employment Equity Act (EEA), which deems an employer guilty of a contravention and liable for the offending employee’s conduct unless it takes “the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act” and “is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of this Act.”

The Court set out the required steps by the victim as –

1. Allege a contravention at the workplace
2. Report the contravention immediately
3. Prove the alleged contravention
4. Allege and prove failure to take the necessary steps.

A victim who can prove all the above is entitled to a deeming order of liability, and to avoid liability it is then up to the employer to prove that it took the necessary and preventative steps.

The victim in this case had no trouble in proving that the incidents of sexual harassment had taken place, but she failed to convince the Court that she had brought the incidents to her employer’s attention “immediately” as required by the section. The Court referred to a previous decision of the Labour Appeal Court suggesting that the word “immediate” be given a “sensible meaning”. In that case a two-month delay in reporting was found to be acceptable as a “limited delay”. However the Court’s comment that “In my view, a delay is an antithesis of the word as literally defined” is a clear warning to victims – report incidents to your employer without delay!

In any event, held the Court, the victim’s delays in reporting (two and three years respectively) meant she had failed to report “immediately” as required.

The Court was equally unimpressed with her suggestion that she had indeed reported the incidents to her employer in time by discussing them with “colleagues and managers”. That, held the Court, was not enough: “As I see it, to my mind, the reporting must be to an employer through the mechanism in its adopted policy.” She had not done that, so there’s another clear lesson for victims there – make a formal report to the correct person/s in terms of your employer’s policies.

Finally, said the Court, the employer had as soon as it received the reports, promptly investigated them and complied with its obligations in terms of the EEA.

Claiming from the offenders themselves

On a related note the Court mentioned that the victim would have a claim direct against the two employees who harassed her. Once again however, time is of the essence for victims – quite apart from the risk of the claim prescribing, the earlier formal reports are made the greater the credibility likely to be given to them.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

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Article courtesy of Law Dot News – Business Law

Companies: Are Restraints of Trade Valid in a Time of Covid?

“For him to be forced out of a career of choice to start working in a different field at a time when many businesses are closing down, retrenchments and lay-offs being commonplace and individual[s] doing everything possible to survive and cope with the health and economic devastating effects of the covid 19 pandemic, is plainly unreasonable and contrary to public policy and constitutional values” (extract from judgment below)

Consider this unhappy (but not unlikely) scenario: For whatever reason, you part ways with your fellow director/shareholder (or perhaps a key employee), who goes off immediately to join (or found) the opposition.

Now you have a major problem – he/she was privy to all your trade secrets and confidential information and they are now being used to compete against you. Your business could be crippled.

Using the time-tested restraint of trade clause

An effective and time-tested way of protecting your business from such a risk is to insist on all directors, shareholders and key employees signing restraint of trade agreements from the start. Such restraints are usually included as clauses in employment contracts and/or (less commonly) in shareholder agreements.

However, it is vital to word the restraint clause correctly if it is to stand up to legal scrutiny.  Although our law has long recognised the right of businesses to enforce this type of contract so as to protect their “proprietary and protectable interests”, and although in general we are held by the law to the agreements that we conclude, there is always a balance struck with the employee’s constitutional rights to be economically active and to earn a living.

As the High Court put it recently: “It is settled law that restraints of trade are valid and binding and, as a matter of principle, enforceable unless, and to the extent that, they are contrary to public policy because they impose an unreasonable restriction on the former employee’s freedom to trade or to work. It is also settled that the onus of establishing that the restraint of trade is unreasonable falls on the former employee.”

A common mistake – going “too wide”

The most common mistake businesses make is to word the restraint of trade too widely (in one or more of type of activity, geographical area or time period). No matter how tempting it may be to do so, that is courting disaster. The wider the clause is, the greater the chances of a court holding it either totally invalid or only partially enforceable. Rather word your clauses tightly and defensibly.

Two recent High Court decisions illustrate both this principle, and the potential impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on our courts’ approach to the questions of reasonableness and time periods.

The impact of the pandemic on the “reasonableness” test

• A director, shareholder and employee of a company specialising in media and advertising solutions resigned as both director and employee after a breakdown in relations, the company owing him R1.2m in short-paid salary. He however retained his shareholding.
• He was subject to restraints of trade (in both his employment and shareholder agreements) which prohibited him from working for a competitor, and from sharing confidential information and trade secrets with them, for 18 months in any of 29 African countries.
• He nevertheless joined a direct competitor (active in 2 of the 29 African countries) and acted in breach of the restraint by contacting customers and business associates. When sued in the High Court for enforcement of the restraint clauses, his main defence was that they were unreasonable and prevented him from earning a living.
• The Court confirmed the need to consider all the relevant circumstances, not only at the time a restraint is entered into, but also at the time that the business tries to enforce its restraint. In this case, the company’s attempts at enforcement encompassed the period March to July 2020 – a time of strict lockdowns and economic turmoil.
• The upshot – the Court rejected the company’s suggestion that the ex-director could remain economically active in another field for which he was qualified, commenting: “For him to be forced out of a career of choice to start working in a different field at a time when many businesses are closing down, retrenchments and lay-offs being commonplace and individual[s] doing everything possible to survive and cope with the health and economic devastating effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, is plainly unreasonable and contrary to public policy and constitutional values”. The restraints were rejected as unenforceable.

The impact of the pandemic on time periods

Another recent High Court decision saw the Court reducing a 2-year restraint, on sales employees who resigned in March and April 2020 respectively, to 14 months.

In doing so the Court took what it considered to be a reasonable base period in the circumstances of 12 months and added 2 months “to compensate for the lockdown period”, also commenting that “…I am aware that our society is living in strange times. The COVID-19 pandemic has played havoc with, inter alia, our economy. Businesses have been prevented from operating and the ability of the applicants to appoint and train new salespersons will undoubtedly have been blunted by the state of the economy. This is of some relevance when considering the length of the period of restraint…”.

So – are restraints of trade valid in times of pandemic and upheaval?

Neither decision means that restraints are necessarily unenforceable or only partially enforceable during times of economic turmoil and high unemployment. Each case will be decided on its own merits, but in assessing whether your own restraint clauses will be considered reasonable and enforceable, they are clearly factors to be borne in mind.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

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Article courtesy of Law Dot News – When Company Directors & Shareholders  Come to Blows | Company Law

When Company Directors and Shareholders Come to Blows…

“…the mere exercise of majority shareholding voting rights does not amount to oppression…” (extract from judgment below)

What happens when a company’s directors and shareholders fall out and cannot reconcile their differences?

“Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct”

If you should find yourself in such an unfortunate situation, our Companies Act offers you several possible remedies.

Professional advice specific to your case is essential here but be aware of a particularly versatile remedy in the form of a court application for relief from “oppressive or prejudicial conduct”. This relief is available where –

1. “any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant”,
2. “the business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant”, or
3. “the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related to the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant.”

If you can prove any of the above, the court has a wide discretion to make any order “it deems fit”, including (a long but not exhaustive list) an interdict against the improper conduct, liquidation if the company is insolvent, business rescue if appropriate, amendment of the Memorandum of Incorporation, “to create or amend a unanimous shareholder agreement”, issue or exchange of shares, appointing additional or replacement directors, declaring persons “delinquent or under probation”, refund of consideration paid for shares, varying or setting aside transactions and agreements, requiring production of financial statements or an accounting/reconciliation, compensation orders, rectification of company registers or records, or trial of any issue.

The critical part, as a recent SCA (Supreme Court of Appeal) judgment shows, is to be able to prove one of those three categories of wrongful conduct. Without that, and no matter how bitter the dispute between you and your nemesis may be, the court has no discretion to grant any of the above relief.

The facts and outcome of the SCA matter are a case in point –

Majority shareholder v fired director

• In a long-established and closely-held fencing manufacturer with only two shareholders but substantial value (the total value of the shares seems to be in the region of between R46m and R74m), the two fell out over a range of issues.
• The fall out culminated in the minority (46.67%) shareholder being removed from his directorship by the majority (53.33%) shareholder. After his removal as director he was also dismissed from his employment as a general manager after being found guilty at a disciplinary hearing of four counts of gross misconduct (one of which involved dishonesty). The misconduct complained of included abuse of trust, conflict of interest and abortive attempts to have the company placed under business rescue and liquidation.
• Long story short, the dispute ended up first in the High Court and ultimately before the SCA, the minority shareholder alleging that he had been excluded from the management of the company, denied management and financial information, excluded from decision making, removed as director to be replaced by the majority shareholder’s husband and brother-in-law, and unlawfully and unfairly dismissed from employment.
• The Court however found on the facts that he had failed to prove that the majority shareholder’s conduct towards him was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or that his interests had been unfairly disregarded. He had been validly removed as a director of the company at a properly constituted shareholders’ meeting (as the Court put it “…the mere exercise of majority shareholding voting rights does not amount to oppression…), and his dismissal as general manager did not amount to oppressive or prejudicial conduct.
• That finding, held the Court, meant that none of the avenues of relief listed above were available to the minority shareholder despite findings that the shareholders’ relationship had broken down irretrievably and was not capable of being resolved.
• As a result, the High Court’s order that the majority shareholder sell her shares to him – an attempt by the High Court “to design or craft a mechanism which would result in a ‘clean break’ between the parties” because “it was not in their best interests to remain ‘in the same bed’” could not stand. Equally the minority shareholder’s new request that the majority shareholder be ordered to buy his shares from him could not succeed.

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

© LawDotNews

Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.

© LawDotNews